Catholic University Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 1

Article 7

1968

MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL
DEFENDANT. A Second Report and Additional Recommendations
by the Special Committee on the Study of Commitment
Procedures and the Law Relating to Incompetents of the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in Cooperation with
the Fordham University School of Law. New York: Fordham
University Press, 1968. Pp. xv, 261. Cloth: $5.95.
Albert Broderick O.P.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview

Recommended Citation
Albert Broderick O.P., MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT. A Second
Report and Additional Recommendations by the Special Committee on the Study of Commitment
Procedures and the Law Relating to Incompetents of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in
Cooperation with the Fordham University School of Law. New York: Fordham University Press, 1968. Pp.
xv, 261. Cloth: $5.95., 18 Cath. U. L. Rev. 120 (1969).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss1/7

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

Book Reviews

MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT.

A Second Report and Additional Recommendations by the Special
Committee on the Study of Commitment Procedures and the Law
Relating to Incompetents of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York in Cooperation with the Fordham University
School of Law. New York: Fordham University Press, 1968.
Pp. xv, 261. Cloth: $5.95.
Ten percent of all Americans have a personal brush with mental disturbance so serious as to require hospitalization. Far greater numbers suffer from
lesser degrees of mental illness. To these and to all thinking citizens, the system of admission to hospitals for the mentally ill is an immediate and pressing problem. 1
[A] law designed to insure justice by saving a mentally incompetent defendant from the risk of wrongful imprisonment on a charge he does not understand, can result in having that defendant-untried, unconvicted and presumed innocent under the law-spend the rest of his life in a maximumsecurity institution .... 2
The first of the above statements capsules the chief concern of the 1962 report of
this special Bar Association Committee: the involuntary admission and retention of
"civil" patients in mental hospitals. The second sounds the chief note of this 1967
report of the Committee: due process for "criminal law patients." That term, loosely
used, includes those patients compulsorily restrained in mental hospitals who (1) are
already under sentence; (2) have been found incompetent to stand trial (some of
these already indicted, others not); (3) have been tried and found not guilty by reason of insanity; or (4) former prisoners whose sentences have expired and others
who are allegedly "dangerously" ill.
This volume, like its predecessor, is a blue-ribbon exhibit of fruitful collaboration
between a conscientious Bar Association Committee (numbering judges, public health
and corrections administrators, and private attorneys among its members) and the
faculty of a law school. Visibility is given to a critical area in which courts, legislators,
administrators and attorneys have failed to make the accepted contemporary standards of procedural due process into a living reality. Few Bar Association Committees
enjoyed such immediate and outstanding success in stimulating legislative change as
did this Committee in its 1962 report, a collaboration with Cornell Law School. The
present report, with Fordham Law School furnishing the staff, was initiated in 1965,
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the year following the passage by the New York State legislature of significant parts
of the 1962 Committee's recommendations with respect to "civil" patients.
In its 1962 report the Committee had successfully argued for the establishment of a
publicly supported Mental Health Information Service in each judicial department.
The legislation 3 provided that the Service's duties are: (a) to study and review the
admission and retention of involuntary patients; (b) to inform patients, and others
interested in their welfare, concerning admission and retention procedures and their
rights to judicial review, representation by counsel, and independent medical opinion;
(c) to provide the court with all relevant information as to the patient's case; and
(d) to provide services and assistance to patients and their families. This new Service
was keyed to a program of periodic judicial review of involuntary patients. A chief
thrust of the 1967 report is to extend the functions of this Mental Health Information
Service to the "criminal law patient." It further distinguishes among the categories
listed above, insisting that all patients not actually under sentence should be treated
as "civil" patients and accorded their hard-won rights of periodic judicial review, outpatient status where feasible, counsel, and independent medical assistance. The Committee argues its case impressively, furnishing both historical background and empirical data.
Many of the complaints against existing arrangements explained in this 1967 report
are mirrored in a current experiment in the District of Columbia which has enjoyed
the full cooperation of the administration and psychiatrists at St. Elizabeths' Hospital.
For the past year and a half, faculty members and law student members of the Legal
Aid Society of the Catholic University Law School have been interviewing patients in
the maximum security wards of St. Elizabeths', the largest government mental hospital in the United States. Where interviews indicate viable legal claims by individual
patients (who fit into the four categories of "criminal law patients" covered by this
1967 report), they are referred to volunteer private lawyers for representation or are
handled by the faculty members themselves. At its outset, the interviewing program
contemplated merely civil claims, but emphasis soon reached the area of alleged undue detention, pending detainers elsewhere, and stimulation of parole. The tentative
conclusion from this experience is that while, as in New York, further legislation may
be necessary, the chief and perhaps unavoidable systematic shortcomings of inertia
and excruciable delay will not be overcome by legislation alone. Some dynamic institutionalized goad seems critically needed to protect individuals from being overlooked
or mislaid in a huge labyrinth (embracing hospital, Mental Health Commission,
bar and courts) that is often notoriously undermanned and overworked. Embraced is
the borderland between two professions-law and medicine-in which each is groping for clarification of its basic premises and responsibilities and whose shortcomings
have particular impact upon those members of society who are poorest, friendless,
and least capable of defending their basic right to personal freedom. The problem is
rendered more complex by the undoubted fact that this freedom is often in conflict
with a prime right of society to protect its members from the predictably "dangerous."
The charge has often been made-which the institutional psychiatrists plausibly deny
3. N.Y.

MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 88

(McKinney Supp. 1967).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. XVIII

-that the labyrinthine actors overreact in defense of this latter social interest. The
Bar Association Committee, both in 1962 and in 1967, reacted conservatively in face
of these two interests of freedom and safety but insisted upon the minimum of
"open" and "adversary" process, frequently renewed, and upon actors to put this
process in motion realistically on behalf of those restrained.
As this Report points out, for those caught in the mental illness web, "[latter-day
procedural reforms can in most instances be traced directly to the need [of the hospital administration and lower courts] immediately to accommodate an adverse judicial decision in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by one of the patients." 4 This
almost "by chance" stimulus is hopelessly inadequate, it is argued, in a nation now
existentially committed to realistic (not merely formal) full hearing, equal protection,
and right to counsel guarantees, as fundamental citizens' rights.
The prospect is not totally one of despair. One may wince (a gentle word) at lost
files (and thus mislaid men), at well-motivated but one-sided psychiatric presentations in (admittedly) medically disputable clinical situations, at the lack of followthrough on the part of some court-appointed (but inadequately compensated, or
uncompensated) attorneys, and at the lack of broad bar association or law school
curiosity in this despised area that falls often between the stools of two professions.
But one may well be encouraged by the. exceptional concern of many dedicated public
psychiatrists, attorneys and judges, at the extreme professional sensitivity evidenced by
committee reports such as these of the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, and of the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 5 and by the
extensive conferences jointly sponsored by the University of Southern California
Schools of Medicine and Law (involving psychiatrists, lawyers, administrators and
judges) which have contributed so much to bringing California to the front rank among
the states in this field.
The Report reviewed here, and the experiences in the District of Columbia and
California, should make clear that further legislation is required to spell out minimum
procedures, to implement requirements for periodic judicial review, and to provide
compensation to attorneys and psychiatrists realistically adequate to insure competent
personal legal and psychiatric advice to indigents confined in mental hospitals, whether on "civil" or "criminal" commitments. But these data also point up that a sustaining professional person, persons, or group (whether from the private or public
sector) is imperative to give day-to-day impetus and follow-through to whatever
norms are currently agreed on for protection both of individual freedom and of public
safety. It might be in the form of a New York-type Mental Health Information Service, an independent ombudsman operating within major mental hospitals or judicial

units, 6 a continuing bar association committee, or a sustaining committee established
4. Cf. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5. Cf. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH MENTAL EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL CASES BEFORE TRIAL-JUDICIAL CONFERENCE

OF D. C. CIRCUIT (1965) (privately printed). A further empirical study is in progress
which will deal with the functioning of counsel in mental health cases, among other

things.
6. Professor Weihofen writes me that a private attorney is being established on an
experimental basis in a mental hospital in New Mexico.
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by a judicial conference to oversee the quality of representation by counsel and the de
facto operation of a system of periodic review of those whose freedom is restrained by
"medical incarceration" ("hospitalization" often being an unreal term here).
This book is unlikely to directly produce as much legislation as its predecessor. For
one thing, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baxstrom v. Herold7 (requiring equal treatment of all patients held on a civil commitment, whether holdovers from an expired sentence or not), which came midway in the Committee's
deliberations, imposed certain requirements which the Committee had already determined to recommend. Further, New York State's Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law was contemporaneously working on areas overlapping those
being investigated by the Committee. This volume, then, may not be as influential as
its predecessor; it is, nonetheless, instructive, clear, thorough and persuasive in pointing
up significant defects in the present public operations within the borderland of mental
illness and crime. It is well footnoted, and compiles substantial informative empirical
data, although one can hardly resist questioning its somewhat superfluous appendices,
and bemoaning its lack of an index. If pressed, we would concede that its specialized
matter would make it strictly a must only for the New York practitioner. Nevertheless, it takes a place with its predecessor, Mental Illness and Due Process, (1966),
with the American Bar Foundation's The Mentally Disabled and the Law, (1961),
and the remarkable Katz-Goldstein-Dershowitz volume, Psychonalysis, Psychiatry and
Law, (1967), as a basic library for lawyers, doctors, mental health administrators,
legislators and judges engaged in, or prepared to be outraged by, this field of interdisciplinary challenge.
ALBERT BRODERICK, O.P.*

7. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of
America.

